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Abstract—We propose to combine social trust derived from social 
networks  with  quality-of-service  (QoS)  trust  derived  from 
communication networks to obtain a composite trust metric as a 
basis  for  evaluating  trust  of  mobile  nodes  in  mobile  ad  hoc 
network  (MANET)  environments.  We  develop  a  novel  model-
based approach to identify the best protocol setting under which 
trust bias is minimized, that is, the peer-to-peer subjective trust as 
a result of executing our distributed trust management protocol 
is close to ground truth status over a wide range of operational 
and  environment  conditions  with  high  resiliency  to  malicious 
attacks and misbehaving nodes.  
Keywords—trust  management;  mobile  ad  hoc  networks;  QoS 
trust; social trust; trust bias minimization. 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Trust management for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) 
(see [1, 2] for a survey) has emerged as a new active research 
area  as  evidenced  by  the  proliferation  of  trust/reputation 
protocols to support mobile group based applications in recent 
years [3-6]. In this paper we address an importance issue of 
trust  management  protocol  design  for  MANETs:  trust  bias 
minimization  despite  misbehaving  nodes  performing  trust-
based attacks.  
Relative  to  existing  works  [3-6]  for  MANET  trust 
management  cited  above,  this  paper  has  two  specific 
contributions.  First,  we  develop  a  new  trust  management 
protocol (SQTrust) based on a composite social and QoS trust 
metric,  with  the  goal  to  yield  peer-to-peer  subjective  trust 
evaluation. A mobile ad hoc group very frequently comprises 
human  operators  carrying  communication  devices.  Thus,  in 
addition to traditional QoS trust metrics such as control packet 
overhead, throughput, packet dropping rate, delay, availability, 
convergence time to reach a steady state in trustworthiness for 
all  participating  nodes,  percentage  of  malicious  nodes,  and 
fault  tolerance,  one  must  also  consider  social  trust  metrics 
including friendship, honesty, privacy, similarity, betweenness 
centrality and social ties for trust management. We note that 
prior works such as [7, 8] also considered social trust metrics 
in  communication  networks.  Our  work  distinguishes  itself 
from  these  prior  works  in  that  we  identify  the  best  trust 
aggregation parameter settings for each individual trust metric 
(either  QoS  or  social)  to  minimize  trust  bias.  Second,  we 
propose  a  novel  model-based  evaluation  technique  for 
validating  SQTrust  based  on  the  concept  of  objective  trust 
evaluation which utilizes knowledge regarding the operational 
and environment conditions to yield the ground truth against 
which subjective trust values obtained from executing SQTrust 
can  be  compared  for  validation.  Our  analysis  methodology 
hinges on the use of Stochastic Petri Net (SPN) mathematical 
modeling  techniques  [9-12]  for  describing  the  “actual” 
dynamic behaviors of nodes in MANETs in the presence of 
well-behaved, uncooperative and malicious nodes. With this 
methodology, we identify the optimal trust parameter settings 
under  which  trust  bias  is  minimized,  i.e.,  SQTrust  is  most 
accurate  compared  with  global  knowledge  and  actual  node 
status.  
II.  SQTRUST FOR MANETS 
A. Trust Composition 
Taking  into  consideration  of  the  proliferation  of  mobile 
devices carried by humans in social ad hoc networks, our trust 
metric consists of two trust types: social trust and QoS trust 
[1]. Social trust is evaluated through interaction experiences in 
social networks to account for social relationships. Among the 
many social trust metrics such as friendship, honesty, privacy, 
similarity,  betweenness  centrality,  and  social  ties,  we  select 
social ties (measured by intimacy) and honesty (measured by 
healthiness)  to  measure  the  social  trust  level  of  a  node  as 
these social properties are considered critical for trustworthy 
mission  execution  in  group  settings.  QoS  trust  is  evaluated 
through the communication and information networks by the 
capability of a node to complete a mission assigned. Among 
the  many  QoS  metrics  such  as  competence,  cooperation, 
reliability,  and  task  performance,  we  select  competence 
(measured by energy) and protocol compliance (measured by 
cooperativeness  in  protocol  execution)  to  measure  the  QoS 
trust  level  of  a  node  since  competence  and  cooperation  are 
considered the most critical QoS trust properties for mission 
execution in group settings. Quantitatively, let a node’s trust 
level toward another node be a real number in the range of [0, 
1],  with  1  indicating  complete  trust,  0.5  ignorance,  and  0 
complete distrust.  
The  rationale  of  selecting  these  social  and  QoS  trust 
metrics  is  given  as  follows.  The  intimacy  component  (for 
measuring social ties) has a lot to do with if two nodes have a 
lot of direct or indirect interaction experiences with each other, 
for  example,  for  packet  routing  and  forwarding.  The 
healthiness component (for measuring honesty) is essentially a 
belief of whether a node is malicious or not. We relate it to the 
probability  that  a  node  is  not  compromised.  The  energy 
component refers to the residual energy of a node, and for a 
MANET  environment,  energy  is  directly  related  to  the 
survivability capability of a node to be able to execute a task 
completely, particularly when the current and future missions may  require  a  long  mission  execution  time.  Finally,  the 
cooperativeness component of a node is related to whether the 
node  is  cooperative  in  routing  and  forwarding  packets.  For 
mobile groups, we relate it to the trust to a node being able to 
faithfully follow the prescribed protocol such as relaying and 
responding to group communication packets. 
We  assert  that  a  node  can  have  fairly  accurate  trust 
assessments toward its 1-hop neighbors utilizing monitoring, 
overhearing and snooping techniques. For example, a node can 
monitor interaction experiences with a target node within radio 
range,  and  can  overhear  the  transmission  power  and  packet 
forwarding activities performed by the target node over a trust 
evaluation window ∆𝑡 to assess the target node’s energy and 
cooperativeness  status.  For  a  target  node  more  than  1-hop 
away, a node will refer to a set of recommenders for its trust 
toward the remote target node.  
B. Trust Aggregation  
A unique feature of our trust aggregation protocol design is 
that we identify and apply the optimal trust parameter settings 
to minimize trust bias, i.e., minimizing the difference between 
subjective trust and objective trust. Here  we define specific 
trust parameters used in our trust aggregation protocol design. 
Later in Section III we leverage a novel model-based approach 
developed in this paper to discover the best trust aggregation 
protocol settings to minimize trust bias.  
Like most trust aggregation protocols for MANETs [1], we 
consider  both  direct  trust  and  indirect  trust.  That  is,  node  i 
evaluates node j at time t by direct observations and indirect 
recommendations.  Direct  observations  are  direct  evidences 
collected  by  node  i  toward  node  j  over  the  time  interval 
[𝑡 − ?∆𝑡,𝑡] when node i and node j are 1-hop neighbors at 
time t. Here ∆𝑡 is the trust update interval and d is a design 
parameter  specifying  the  extent  to  which  recent  interaction 
experiences would contribute to intimacy. We can go back as 
far as t=0, that is, d=t/∆𝑡, if all interaction experiences are 
considered  equally  important.  Indirect  recommendations  are 
indirect  evidences  given  to  node  i  by  a  subset  of  1-hop 
neighbors  selected  based  on  two  mechanisms  against 
slandering attacks: (a) threshold-based filtering by which only 
trustworthy recommenders with trust higher than a minimum 
trust  threshold  are  qualified  as  recommenders,  and  (b) 
relevance-based trust by which only recommenders with high 
trust in trust component X are qualified as recommenders to 
provide recommendations about a trustee’s trust component X.  
Summarizing above, node i will compute its trust toward 
node j, 𝑇 , 
 (𝑡), where X is a trust component by: 
𝑇 , 
 (𝑡)      𝑇 , 
      ,    (𝑡)      𝑇 , 
          ,    (𝑡)  (1)   
In  Equation  1,    is  a  parameter  to  weigh  node  i’s  own 
information toward node j at time t, i.e., “direct observations” 
or “self-information” and    is a parameter to weigh indirect 
information  from  recommenders,  i.e.,  “information  from 
others,” with            1.  
The  direct  trust  part,  𝑇 , 
       ,    (𝑡),  in  Equation  1  is 
evaluated by node i at time t depending on if node i is a 1-hop 
neighbor  of  node  j  at  time  t.  If  yes,  node  i  uses  its  direct 
observations  toward  node  j  during  [𝑡 − ?∆𝑡,𝑡 ]  to  update 
𝑇 , 
       ,    (𝑡) where ∆𝑡 is the periodic trust evaluation interval. 
Otherwise, it uses its old direct trust assessment at time 𝑡 − ∆𝑡 
multiplied by ?   ∆  (for exponential trust decay over time) to 
update 𝑇 , 
       ,    (𝑡) .  Specifically,  node  i  will  compute 
𝑇 , 
      ,    (𝑡) by: 
  𝑇 , 
      ,    (𝑡)   {
𝑇 , 
     ,     (𝑡)                                  𝑡 
?   ∆    𝑇 , 
      , (𝑡 − ∆𝑡)                  
 
  (2)   
Here  we  note  that    𝑇 , 
      ,    (𝑡)  replaces  𝑇 , 
      , (𝑡 −
∆𝑡)  after  the  computation.  So  there  won’t  be  a  storage 
overflow problem. To account for trust decay over time, we 
adopt an exponential time decay factor, ?   ∆ , to satisfy the 
desirable property that trust decay must be invariable to the 
trust  update  frequency.  Depending  on  the  trust  evaluation 
interval ∆𝑡, we can fine tune the value of λd  to test the effect of 
trust decay over time. The notation  𝑇 , 
     ,     (𝑡) here refers 
to the new “direct” trust assessment at time t. We adopt the 
Bayesian  trust/reputation  model  [13]  with  Beta  (А,  В) 
distribution  such  that  А/(А+В)  is  the  estimated  direct  trust 
with А as the number of positive service experiences and В as 
the number of negative service experiences. 
The  indirect  trust  part, 𝑇 , 
         ,    (𝑡) in  Equation  1  is 
evaluated by node i at time t by taking in recommendations 
from  a  subset  of  1-hop  neighbors  selected  following  the 
threshold-based  filtering  and  relevance-based  trust  selection 
criteria. Specifically, node i will compute 𝑇 , 
        ,    (𝑡) by: 
  𝑇 , 
        ,    (𝑡)  
{
 
 
 
 ∑ (𝑇 , 
  (𝑡)  𝑇 , 
  (𝑡))    
  
                
?   ∆    𝑇 , 
        , (𝑡 − ∆𝑡)           
 
  (3)   
In Equation 3, m is a recommender and V is a set of    
recommenders  chosen  by  node  i  from  its  1-hop  neighbors 
which  satisfy  the  threshold-based  filtering  and  relevance-
based  trust  selection  criteria.  That  is,  these  are  the 
recommenders for which node i’s 𝑇 , 
  (𝑡) in trust component X 
is higher than a minimum threshold denoted by 𝑇 
 . Here we 
note that when a recommender node, say, node m, provides its 
recommendation  to  node  i  for  evaluating  node  j  in  trust 
component  X,  node  i's  trust  in  node  m  is  also  taken  into 
consideration as reflected in the product term on the right hand 
side of Equation 3. This accounts for trust decay over space. If 
   =0  then  𝑇 , 
        ,    (𝑡)    ?          𝑇 , 
        ,    (𝑡 − ∆𝑡)  to 
account for trust decay over time. 
C. Trust Formation 
While many trust formation models exist [1], we adopt the 
importance-weighted-sum  model  with  which  trust  is  an 
importance-weighted  sum  of  social  trust  and  QoS  trust.  It 
encompasses  more-social-trust,  more-QoS-trust,  social-trust-
only, and QoS-trust-only in trust formation. It is particularly 
applicable to missions where context information is available 
about  the  importance  of  social  or  QoS  trust  properties  for 
successful  mission  execution.  For  example,  for  a  mission 
consisting of unmanned mobile nodes, the more-QoS-trust or 
QoS-trust-only trust formation model will be appropriate. The 
issue  of  determining  optimal  trust  formation  parameters  for 
maximizing application performance is outside the scope of 
the paper and the reader is referred to [14] for more detail. The 
subjective trust value of node j as evaluated by node i at time t, denoted as 𝑇 , (𝑡), thus is computed by node i as a weighted 
average of intimacy, healthiness, energy, and cooperativeness 
trust components. The assessment is done periodically in every 
∆𝑡 interval. Specifically node i will compute 𝑇 , (𝑡) by: 
𝑇 , (𝑡)   ∑     𝑇 , 
   (𝑡)
 
  (4)   
where 𝑇 , 
 (𝑡) is the trust belief of node i toward node j in trust 
component X=intimacy, healthiness, energy or cooperativeness 
and    is the weight associated with X.  
An interesting  metric is the overall average  “subjective” 
trust level of node j, denoted by 𝑇  
   (𝑡), as evaluated by all 
active  nodes.  Once  we  obtain  𝑇 , (𝑡)  from  Equation  4, 
𝑇  
   (𝑡) can be computed by: 
𝑇  
   (𝑡)  
∑ 𝑇 , (𝑡)        
∑ 1        
  (5)   
In  this  paper,  we  compare 𝑇  
   (𝑡) with  the  “objective” 
trust of node j, denoted by 𝑇  
   (𝑡), calculated based on actual, 
global information to see how much deviation subjective trust 
evaluation is from objective trust evaluation. Specifically, let 
𝑇  
   , (𝑡)  denote  the  “objective”  trust  of  node  j  in  trust 
component X at time t, which we can obtain by a mathematical 
model (see  Section  III below).  Then, following Equation 4, 
𝑇  
   (𝑡) is calculated by: 
𝑇  
   (𝑡)   ∑     𝑇  
    , (𝑡)
 
  (6)   
III.  ANALYTICAL MODEL 
A.  Node SPN for Modeling Node Behavior 
Figure  1  shows  the  “node”  SPN  model  developed  for 
describing  the  lifetime  behavior  of  a  mobile  node  in  the 
presence  of  other  uncooperative  and  malicious  nodes  in  a 
mobile  group  following  the  input  operational  profile.  The 
system SPN model consists of N node SPN models where N is 
the number of nodes in the system. We utilize the node SPN 
model  to  obtain  a  single  node’s  information  (e.g.,  intimacy, 
healthiness, energy, and cooperativeness) and to derive its trust 
relationships with other nodes in the system. It also captures 
location  information  of  a  node  as  a  function  of  time.  We 
consider a square-shaped operational area consisting of M×M 
regions each with the width and height equal to radio radius R. 
The node mobility model is specified as part of the operational 
profile.  
 
Figure 1: Node SPN Model. 
 
The  reason  of  using  node  SPN  models  is  to  yield  a 
probability  model  (a  semi-Markov  chain)  to  model  the 
stochastic behavior of nodes in the system, given the system’s 
anticipated operational profile as input. The theoretical analysis 
yields  objective  trust  based  on  ground  truth  of  node  status, 
against  which  subjective  trust  as  a  result  of  executing  our 
proposed  trust  protocol  is  compared.  This  provides  the 
theoretical  foundation  that  subjective  trust  (from  protocol 
execution)  is  accurate  compared  with  ground  truth.  The 
underlying  semi-Markov  chain  has  a  state  representation 
comprising  “places”  in  the  SPN  model.  A  node’s  status  is 
indicated  by  a  5-component  state  representation  (Location, 
Member, Energy, CN, UNCOOP) with “Location” (an integer) 
indicating  the  current  region  the  node  resides,  “Member”  (a 
boolean variable) indicating if the node is a member, “Energy” 
(an  integer)  indicating  the  current  energy  level,  “CN”  (a 
boolean variable) indicating if the node is compromised, and 
“UNCOOP”  (a  boolean  variable)  indicating  if  the  node  is 
cooperative. For example, place Location is a state component 
whose value is indicated by the number of “tokens” in place 
Location. A state transition happens in the semi-Markov chain 
when  a  move  event  occurs  with  the  event  occurrence  time 
interval  following  a  probabilistic  time  distribution  such  as 
exponential,  Weibull,  Pareto,  and  hyper-exponential 
distributions.  This  is  modeled  by  a  “transition”  with  the 
corresponding firing time in the SPN model. Below we explain 
how we construct the node SPN model.  
Location: Transition T_LOCATION is triggered when the 
node moves to another region from its current location with the 
rate calculated as         ⁄  (i.e., the node’s mobility rate) based 
on  an  initial  speed  (Sinit)  and  wireless  radio  range  (R). 
Depending on the location a node moves into, the number of 
tokens in place Location is adjusted. Suppose that nodes move 
randomly.  Then  a  node  randomly  moves  to  one  of  four 
locations in four directions (i.e., north, west, south, and east) in 
accordance with its mobility rate. The underlying semi-Markov 
model  of  the  node  SPN  model  when  solved  gives  the 
probability that a node is at a particular location at time t, e.g., 
the probability that node i is located in region j at time t. This 
information along with the location information of other nodes 
at time t provides global information if two nodes are 1-hop 
neighbors at time t. 
Intimacy:  Intimacy  trust  is  an  aggregation  of  direct 
interaction experience (Ti,j
direct,intimacy(t)) and indirect interaction 
experience  (Ti,j
indirect,intimacy(t)).  Out  of  these  two,  only  new 
direct  interaction  experience  (Ti,j
direct,intimacy(t)  via  Ti,j
1-hop, 
intimacy(t))  is  calculated  based  on  if  two  nodes  are  1-hop 
neighbors  interacting with each other via packet forwarding 
and routing. Since the node SPN model gives us the probability 
that  a  node  is  in  a  particular  location  at  time  t,  we  can 
objectively  compute  direct  interaction  experience 
𝑇 , 
     ,           (𝑡) (see Equation 2) based on the probability 
of nodes i and j are in the same location at time t from the 
output of the two SPN models associated with nodes i and j. 
Energy: Place Energy represents the current energy level of 
a  node.  An  initial  energy  level  of  each  node  is  assigned 
differently to reflect node heterogeneity. We randomly generate 
a  number  between  12  to  24  hours  based  on  uniform 
distribution,  representing  a  node’s  initial  energy  level  Einit. 
Then we put a number of tokens in place Energy corresponding 
to this initial energy level. A token is taken out when transition 
T_ENERGY  fires.  The  transition  rate  of  T_ENERGY  is 
adjusted on the fly based on a node’s state: it is lower when a 
Energy 
T_ENERGY 
  Member 
T_JOIN  T_LEAVE 
CN 
T_COMPRO 
UNCOOP 
  Location 
T_LOCATIO
N 
T_UNCOOP node becomes uncooperative to save energy and is higher when 
the  node  becomes  compromised  so  that  it  performs  attacks 
more and consumes energy more. Therefore, depending on the 
node’s status, its energy consumption is dynamically changed. 
Healthiness:  A  node  is  compromised  when  transition 
T_COMPRO fires. The rate to transition T_COMPRO is      
as the node compromising rate (or the capture rate) reflecting 
the hostility of the application. If the node is compromised, a 
token  goes  to  CN,  meaning  that  the  node  is  already 
compromised  and  may  perform  good-mouthing  and  bad-
mouthing attacks as a recommender by good-mouthing a bad 
node with a high trust recommendation and bad-mouthing a 
good node with a low trust recommendation.  
Cooperativeness:  Place  UNCOOP  represents  whether  a 
node is cooperative or not. If a node becomes uncooperative, a 
token goes to UNCOOP by triggering T_UNCOOP. The rate to 
transition  T_UNCOOP  is  modeled  as  a  function  of  its 
remaining energy, the mission difficulty, and the neighborhood 
uncooperativeness degree as follows:  
  𝑡?(𝑇       )  
   (       )   (           )   (       )
𝑇   
  (7)   
where          represents  the  node’s  current  energy  level  as 
given in place Energy,             is the difficulty level of the 
given  mission,           is  the  degree  of  uncooperativeness 
computed  based  on  the  ratio  of  uncooperative  nodes  to 
cooperative nodes among 1-hop neighbors and 𝑇    is the group 
communication  interval  over  which  a  node  may  decide  to 
become uncooperative in protocol execution and drop packets. 
The  form   ( )         follows  the  demand-pricing 
relationship  in  Economics [15-17]  to  model the  effect  of  its 
argument x on the uncooperative behavior, including: 
     (       ): If a node has a lower level of energy, it is less 
likely  to  be  cooperative.  This  is  to  consider  a  node’s 
individual utility in resource-constrained environments. 
     (           ): If a node is assigned to a more difficult 
mission,  it  is  more  likely  to  be  cooperative  to  ensure 
successful mission execution.  
     (       ):  If  a  node’s  1-hop  neighbors  are  not  very 
cooperative, the node is more likely to be cooperative to 
complete a given mission successfully. 
A  compromised  node  is  necessarily  uncooperative  as  it 
won’t  follow  the  protocol  execution  rules.  So  if  place  CN 
contains a token, place UNCOOP will also contain a token. 
B.  Obtaining  Objective  Trust  for  Validating  SQTrust 
Protocol Design  
With the node behaviors modeled by a probability model (a 
semi-Markov  chain)  described  above,  the  objective  trust 
evaluation of node j in trust component X, i.e., 𝑇  
   , (𝑡), can be 
obtained  based  on  exact  global  knowledge  about  node  j  as 
modeled by its node SPN model. To calculate each of these 
objective  trust  probabilities  of  node  j,  one  would  assign  a 
reward of     with state s of the underlying semi-Markov chain 
of the SPN model to obtain the probability weighed average 
reward as: 
𝑇  
   , (𝑡)   ∑(         (𝑡))
   
  (8)   
for X = healthiness, energy or cooperativeness, and as: 
𝑇  
   , (𝑡)  
    ∆ 
 
∑ (         (𝑡 ))?𝑡     
?∆𝑡
  (9)   
for X = intimacy. Here S indicates the set of states in the 
underlying semi-Markov chain of our SPN model,     is the 
reward to be assigned to state s, and    (𝑡) is the probability 
that the system is in state s at time t, which can be obtained 
by solving the underlying semi-Markov model of our SPN 
model  utilizing  known  solution  techniques  such  as  SOR, 
Gauss Seidel, or Uniformization [12]. Table 1 summarizes 
specific  reward  assignments  used  to  calculate 𝑇  
   , (𝑡) for 
X=intimacy,  healthiness,  energy,  or  cooperativeness.  In 
Table 1,    is the energy threshold below which the energy 
trust toward a node goes to 0. Once 𝑇  
   , (𝑡) is obtained, we 
compute the average objective trust value of node j, 𝑇  
   (𝑡), 
based on Equation 6. It is compared with average subjective 
trust of node j,  𝑇  
   (𝑡), defined in Equation 5 to compute 
trust bias obtained to validate our trust protocol design. 
 
Table 1: Reward Assignments for Objective Trust Evaluation. 
Component trust 
probability toward node j     : reward  assignment to state s 
𝑇  
   ,        (𝑡)  1        (         𝑡   ) is within a 5-
region neighbor area at time t; 0 otherwise 
𝑇  
    ,           (𝑡)  1    (    (      )    ); 0 otherwise 
𝑇  
   ,      (𝑡)  1    (    (      ?   )     ); 0 
otherwise 
𝑇  
   ,               (𝑡)  1    (    (          )    ); 0 
otherwise 
 
 
Table 2: Operational Profile for a Mobile Group Application. 
Parameter  Value  Parameter  Value 
# of regions  6x6  R  250m 
area  1250mx1250m  Einit  [12, 24] hrs 
Sinit  (0, 2] m/sec.   1.2 
1/λcom  18 hrs   0.8 
Tgc  120 sec.  𝑇 
   0.6 
IV.  RESULTS  
Table  2  lists  the  parameter  set  and  their  default  values 
specifying  the  operational  profile  given  as  input  for  testing 
SQTrust for a mobile group of size of 150 nodes in MANET 
environments. Initially all nodes are not compromised. When a 
node is compromised and turns malicious, it performs good-
mouthing and bad-mouthing attacks, i.e., it  will provide the 
most positive recommendation (that is, 1) toward a bad node 
to  facilitate  collusion,  and  conversely  the  most  negative 
recommendation (that is, 0) toward a good node to ruin the 
reputation of the good node. The initial trust level is set to 1 
for healthiness, energy and cooperativeness because all nodes 
are considered trustworthy initially. The initial trust level of 
intimacy is set to the probability that a node is found to be in a 
5-region neighbor area relative to 6x6 regions in accordance 
with the intimacy definition. Given this operational profile as 
input to the mobile group application, we aim to identify the 
best  setting  of  β1:  β2  (with  higher  β1  meaning  more  direct 
observations or self-information being used for subjective trust 
evaluation)  under  which  trust  bias  is  minimized,  i.e., subjective trust is closest to objective trust. For trust protocol 
execution, we set the decay coefficient        .  1,  and the 
trust  evaluation  interval ∆𝑡   20  min,  resulting  in ?   ∆   
 .98 to model small trust decay over time. Also the minimum 
recommender threshold 𝑇 
  is set to 0.6, the trust evaluation 
window  size  d  is  set  to  2,  and  the  minimum  energy  trust 
threshold ET is set to 0.  
Figure  2  shows  the  node’s  overall  trust  values  obtained 
from subjective trust evaluation vs. objective trust evaluation, 
i.e., 𝑇  
   (𝑡) vs. 𝑇  
    (𝑡),  for  the  equal-weight  ratio  case  as  a 
function of time, with β1: β2 varying from 0.6: 0.4 (60% direct 
evaluation:  40%  indirect  evaluation)  to  0.9:  0.1  (90%  direct 
evaluation: 10% indirect evaluation). The 10% increment in β1 
allows us to identify the best β1: β2 ratio under which subjective 
trust is closest to objective trust. We see that subjective trust 
evaluation  results  are  closer  and  closer  to  objective  trust 
evaluation results (and thus smaller trust bias) as we use more 
conservative  direct  observations  or  self-information  for 
subjective trust evaluation. However, there is a cutoff point (at 
about 85%) after which subjective trust evaluation overshoots. 
This  implies  that  using  too  much  direct  observations  for 
subjective  trust  evaluation  could  overestimate  trust  because 
there is  little chance  for a  node  to  use  indirect  observations 
from  trustworthy  recommenders. Our  analysis  allows  such  a 
cutoff  point  to  be  determined  to  minimize  trust  bias,  given 
design  considerations  regarding  trust  decay  over  time 
(?   ∆     .98  for direct trust decay in our case study). The 
result is validated by ns3 simulation (not shown due to limited 
space). 
V.  CONCLUSION AND APPLICABILITY 
The identification of optimal protocol settings to minimize 
trust bias and maximize application performance is performed 
at static time. One way to apply the results for dynamic trust 
management is to build a lookup table at static time listing the 
optimal protocol settings discovered over a perceivable range 
of  parameter  values.  Then,  at  runtime,  upon  sensing  the 
environment  conditions  matching  with  a  set  of  parameter 
values, a  node can perform  a  simple table  lookup operation 
augmented  with  extrapolation/interpolation  techniques  to 
determine and apply the optimal protocol setting to minimize 
trust bias in response to environment changes. In the future we 
plan  to  consider  more  sophisticated  attacker  behaviors 
including opportunistic, random and insidious attacks [18] to 
further test the resiliency of our trust protocol design. 
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Figure 2: Overall Trust Evaluation: Subjective Trust is Most Accurate 
When using 85% Direct Trust Evaluation (β1:β2=0.85:0.15). 
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